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The most comprehensive and almost cover-all organization of the documents of the Nigerian Civil War 
remains AHM Kirk-Greene's CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA, A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-1970 
Volume 1, and Volume 2, published by Oxford University Press London, New York and Ibadan in 1971. 
Volume One, according to the blurb, “describes the prelude to the war and the succession of coups from 
that of 15 January1966 which initially brought a military regime to power in Nigeria”. The volume takes 
the story up to July 1967 when the war began. Volume Two covers July 1967 to January 1970, that is, 
between the beginning of hostilities, and when, as testified by the last entry in the volume, General 
Yakubu Gowon made a Victory broadcast, The Dawn of National Reconciliation, on January 15, 1970. No 
other collection of civil war documents, to my knowledge, exists that compares with these two volumes. 
And none, as far as I know, has attempted to update or complement the publications so as to include or 
make public, other documents that are absent from Kirk-Greene's yeoman's job. Yet, as my title 
pointedly insists, there have been some truly 'forgotten' documents of the Nigerian Civil War which 
ought to be added and without which much of the history being narrated will continue to suffer gaps 
that empower enormous misinterpretations, if not falsehoods. 
In my view, the most forgotten documents of the Nigerian civil war, which deserved to be, but were not 
included in the original compilation by Kirk-Greene – are two. The first is the much talked-about, but 
never seen, Ifeajuna Manuscript. It was written by Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, the leader of the January 
15, 1966 Coup that opened the floodgates to other untoward events leading to the civil war. The author 
poured it all down in the “white hot heat” of the first few weeks after the failed adventure that ushered 
in the era of military regimes in Nigeria's history. Not, as many would have wished, the story of how the 
five majors carried out the coup. It is more of an apologia, a statement of why they carried out the coup, 
and what they meant to achieve by it. It is still unpublished, so many decades after it was written. The 
Manuscript had begun to circulate, very early, in what may now be seen as samizdat editions. They 
passed from hand to hand in photocopies, in an underground career that seemed fated to last forever, 
until 1985 when retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, after his first coming as Head of State, quoted 
generously from it in his biography of his friend, Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, the man who, 
although, not the leader of the coup, became its historical avatar and spokesperson. Indeed, Nzeogwu's 
media interviews in the first 48 hours after the coup have remained the benchmark for praising or 
damning it. Ifeajuna's testimony fell into the hands of the military authorities quite early and has been in 
limbo. Few Nigerians know about its existence. So many who know about it have been wondering why 
the manuscript has not seen the light of day.   
The other document, the second most forgotten of the Nigerian Civil War, has had more luck than the 
Ifeajuna Manuscript. It happens to be the transcript of the famous meeting of May 6th and 7th 1967, 
held at Enugu, between Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Military Governor of Eastern 
Region, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Leader of the Yoruba and an old political opponent of the leaders 
of the Eastern Region. Awolowo attended the meeting at the head of a delegation of peace hunters in a 
bid to avert a shooting war after the pogrom against Easterners which presaged the counter-coup of July 
29, 1966. The transcripts of the meeting, never publicly known to have existed, entered public discourse 
formally when a speech by Chief Obafemi Awolowo delivered on the first day of the meeting was 
published in a book, Path to Nigerian Greatness, edited by MCK Ajuluchuku, the Director for Research 
and Publicity of the Unity Party of Nigeria, in 1980. The speech seemed too much of a teaser. So it 
remained, until it was followed by Awo on the Nigerian Civil War, edited by Bari Adedeji Salau in 1981, 
with a “Foreword” by the same MCK Ajuluchuku. The book went beyond the bit and snippet allowed in 
the earlier publication by accommodating the full transcripts of the two-day meeting.  
Not much was made of it by the media until it went out of print. Partly for this reason and because of 
the limited number in circulation, the transcripts never entered recurrent discussions of the Nigerian 
civil war. The good thing is that, if only for the benefit of those who missed it before, the book has been 
reprinted. It was among twelve other books by Obafemi Awolowo re-launched by the African Press Ltd 
of Ibadan at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, in March 2007. Important to note is 
that among other speeches made by Awolowo, before, during and after, on the Nigerian Civil War, the 
transcripts are intact. They reveal who said what between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, his Excellency Lt. 
Col. Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Sir Francis Ibiam, Chiefs Jereton Mariere, C.C. Mojekwu, JIG Onyia, 
Professors Eni Njoku, Samuel Aluko and Dr. Anezi Okoro, who attended the meeting. Unlike the Ifeajuna 
Manuscript, still in limbo, the transcripts are in respectable print and may be treated as public property 
or at least addressed as a feature of the public space. 
I regard both documents as the most forgotten documents of the civil war, because they have hardly 
been mentioned in public discourses in ways that recognize the gravity of their actual contents.  Or 
better to say, they have been mentioned, only in passing, in articles written for major Nigerian 
newspapers and magazines since the 70s, or parried on television, but only in figurative 
understatements by people who, for being able to do so, have appeared highly privileged. The privilege, 
grounded in the fact that they remained unpublished, may have been partially debunked by the 
publications I have mentioned, but their impact on the discussions have not gone beyond the hyped 
references to them, and the innuendos and insinuations arising from secessionist propaganda during the 
civil war.  
The core of the propaganda, which reverberated at the Christopher Okigbo International Conference at 
Harvard University in September, 2007, is that Awolowo promised that if the Igbos were allowed, by 
acts of commission or omission, to secede, he would take the Western Region out of Nigeria. In a sort of 
Goebellian stunt, many ex-Biafrans including high flying academics, intellectuals and publicists who 
should know better, write about it as if they do not know that the shooting war ended in 1970. What 
Awolowo is supposed to have discussed with Ojukwu before the shooting war has been turned into an 
issue for post-war propaganda even more unrestrained than in the days of the shooting war. The 
propaganda of the war has been dutifully regurgitated by a Minister of the Federal Republic, Mrs Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala, twice on loan to the Federal Government of Nigerian from the World Bank, in the book, 
Achebe: Teacher of Light (Africa World Press, Inc, 2003), co-authored with Tijan M. Sallah. They write: 
“The Igbos had made the secessionist move with the promise from Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the 
Southwest that the Yoruba would follow suit. The plan was if the southeast and southwest broke away 
from the Nigerian federal union, the federal government would not be able to fight a war on two fronts. 
Awolowo, however, failed to honour his pledge, and the secession proved a nightmare for the Igbos. 
Awolowo in fact became the Minister of finance of the federal government during the civil war.” (p. 90). 
Forty years after the civil war, you would expect that some formal, academic decorum would be brought 
into play to sift mere folklore and propaganda from genuine history. But not so for those who do not 
care about the consequences of the falsehoods that they trade. They continue to pump myths that treat 
their own people as cannon fodder in their elite search for visibility, meal tickets and upward mobility in 
the Nigerian spoils system.  
Rather than lower the frenzy of war-time 'huge lies' that were crafted for the purpose of shoring up 
combat morale, they increase the tempo. I mean: post-war reconstruction should normally forge the 
necessity for returnees from the war to accede to normal life, rather than lose their everyday good 
sense in contemplation of events that never happened or pursuing enemies who were never there. 
Better, it ought to be expected, for those who must apportion blame and exact responsibility, to work at 
a dogged sifting of fact from fiction, relieving the innocent of life-threatening charges, in the manner of 
the Jews who, after the Second World War sought to establish who were responsible for the pogroms 
before they pressed implacable charges.  
Unfortunately, 40 years does not seem to have been enough in the Nigerian case. Those who organized 
the pogrom are lionized as patriots by champions of the Biafran cause. Those who sought lasting 
answers away from blind rampage are demonized as villains. The rest of us are all left mired in the 
ghastly incomprehension that led to the war. Those for whom the civil war was not a lived, but a 
narrated experience, are made to re-experience it as nightmare, showing how much of an effort of mind 
needs to be made to strip the past of sheer mush. As it happens, every such effort continues to be 
waylaid by the sheerness of war propaganda that has been turned into post-war authoritative history. It 
is often offered by participants in the war who, like Dim Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu himself, will not give 
up civil war reflexes that ruined millions. 
In an interview in Boston on July 9th 2001, Ojukwu told a questioner: “We've said this over and over 
again, so many times, and people don't understand: they don't want to actually. If you remember, I 
released Awolowo from jail. Even that, some people are beginning to contest as well. Awo was in jail in 
Calabar. Gowon knows and the whole of the federal establishment knows that at no point was Gowon in 
charge of the East. The East took orders from me. Now, how could Gowon have released Awolowo who 
was in Calabar? Because the fact that I released him, it created quite a lot of rapport between Awo and 
myself, and I know that before he went back to Ikenne, I set up a hotline between Ikenne and my 
bedroom in Enugu.  He tried, like an elder statesman to find a solution. Awolowo is a funny one. Don't 
forget that the political purpose of the coup, the Ifeajuna coup that began all this, was to hand power 
over to Awo. We young men respect him a great deal. He was a hero. I thought he was a hero and 
certainly I received him when I was governor. We talked and he was very vehement when he saw our 
complaints and he said that if the Igbos were forced out by Nigeria that he would take the Yorubas out 
also. I don't know what anybody makes of that statement but it is simple. Whether he did or didn't , it is 
too late. There is nothing you can do about it. So, he said this and I must have made some appropriate 
responses too. But it didn't quite work out the way that we both thought. Awolowo, evidently, had a 
constant review of the Yoruba situation and took different path. That's it. I don't blame him for it. I have 
never done”. This was quoted in Rudolf Ogoo Okonkwo's article, reporting the Okigbo International 
Conference, on page 102 of The GUARDIAN, Monday, October 1, 2007. Quite an interesting one for 
anyone who wishes to appreciate the folkloric dimensions that mis-led many who listened to Radio 
Biafra or have followed the post-war attempts to win the war in retrospect instead of preparing the 
survivors, on both sides of the war, to confront the reality that mauled them and could maul them again 
unless they shape up. 
Against Ojukwu's self-expiatory remarks, it is of interest to read Hilary Njoku, the head of the Biafran 
army at the start of the war. In his war memoirs,  A tragedy without heroes, he declares that the 
meeting between Obafemi Awolowo and Ojukwu had nothing to do with the decision to announce 
secession.  Njoku writes that: “…most progressive Nigerians, even before him, saw 'Biafra' as a 
movement, an egalitarian philosophy to put Nigeria in order, a Nigeria where no tribe is considered 
superior to the others forever…….It was the same Biafran spirit which led Chief Awolowo to declare 
publicly that if the Eastern Region was pushed out of Nigeria, then the Western Region would follow 
suit. When Ojukwu moved too fast recklessly in his ostrich strategy, the same Chief Awolowo led a 
delegation of Western and some Midwestern leaders to Enugu on 6th May, 1967 and pleaded with 
Ojukwu not to secede, reminding him that the Western Region was not militarily ready to follow suit in 
view of the weaknesses of the Western Command of the Nigerian Army and the dominant position of 
the Northern troops in the West. Ojukwu turned a deaf ear to this advice maybe because of his wrong 
concept”.(p.141) 
Anyone wishing to, or refusing to, take Ojukwu's word for it may do worse than read what I am calling 
the forgotten documents. I am of the view that there are immovable grounds for refusing to take 
Ojukwu's word on faith.  Or, may be, faith would be excusable if one has not read the transcripts of the 
Enugu meeting in addition to the mileage of information provided by many post-civil war narrations 
since Alexander A. Madiebo's opener, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War. What seems to be 
unknown to hagiographers of the civil war is that the meeting about which they have told so much was 
actually documented. The transcripts of the meeting are no longer secrets. They have been in the open 
for more three decades,  providing a basis for recasting the seduction of the propaganda which pictured 
the meeting as a secret one with participants being the only ones who could vouch for what was or was 
not said. Arguably, dependence on sheer memory, living in a folklorist's paradise, may well have enabled 
all and sundry to feel free to mis-describe what transpired, to build an industry of deliberate 
falsification, leaving common everyday information to be whispered about as to their earth-shaking 
impact, as if a loud comment on them would bring the sky down. Indeed, it can be imagined how the old 
propaganda lines about what happened at the Enugu meeting helped to shore up morale on the 
secessionist side during the civil war while, on the Federal side, absolute silence or 'rogue' mis-use and 
abuse of their supposed truth-value, powered official indifference, somersaults and snide reviews, in 
speech and action. Since  there are many on both sides of the civil war who have had rationales for not 
letting the whole truth survive, it may be seen as quite convenient to have found a man like Awolowo, 
too much of a thorn in the flesh of many, as a necessary scapegoat. It explains why no proper history of 
the Nigerian Civil War is to be found which looks with dispassion at the issues and without contrived 
gaps. Few, without the benefit of the light that the two forgotten documents bring to bear on the issues, 
have been able to interrogate the purveyors of the falsehoods - the big men who did not know the truth 
but have had to say something authoritative about it; or those who know it but have had reasons, 
personal and public, for not vouchsafing it.  Besides, there exists a gaggle of revisionists and post-war 
hackers who do not want the truth to be known because it hurts their pride as inheritors of the 
falsehoods. They prefer, through a brazen parroting of unfounded folklore, to swindle generations that, 
as a result, have become unavailable for  the building of genuine nation-sense that can accommodate all 
Nigerians.  So over-powering has been their impact that logically impossible and groundless historical 
scenarios, deserving of contempt by all rational people, are trussed up and served as staple. I believe 
that given such poor historical accounting, the benign, intelligent, form of amnesia that, after a civil war, 
helps people to deal with the reality, has been repressed by voluble folklore. 
Therefore, let me make a clean breast of it: my one great rationale for wanting to see the documents 
'outed'  is to help shore up nation-sense among Nigerians by rupturing the culture of falsehoods and 
silences that have exercised undue hegemony over the issues. I take it as part of a necessary revolt 
against all the shenanigans of national coyness and the culture of unspoken taboos that have beclouded 
and ruined national discourse. What primes this revolt is, first and foremost, the thought of what could 
have happened if the forgotten documents had seen the light of day at the right time. How easy, for 
instance, would it have been to stamp the January 15, 1966 Coup as being merely an Igbo Coup if it was 
known that the original five majors who planned and executed it were minded to release Awolowo from 
Calabar Prison and to make him their leader - as the Ifeajuna Manuscript vouchsafed in the first few 
weeks of the coup before the testimonies that came after? What factors -  ethnic frigidity, ideological 
insipidity or plain sloppy dithering could it have been that frustrated the coup-maker's idealistic  
exercise since they were not even pushing for direct seizure of power?  I concede that knowing this may 
not have completely erased the ethnic and regionalist motivations and overlays grafted by later events.  
But it could have slowed down the wild harmattan fire of dissension that soon engulfed the initial 
salutary reception of the coup. Were the truth known early enough, it could have obviated many of the 
sad and untoward insinuations, and the grisly events to which they led,  before during and since the civil 
war. At the worst, it could have changed, if not the course of Nigeria's history, at least, the manner of 
assessing that history and therefore the tendency for much  civic behaviour to derive from mere myths 
and fictional engagements. 
To say this, I admit, is to make a very big claim! It suggests that the  problems  of nation-building in 
Nigeria would have been either solved, ameliorated or their nature changed rather dramatically if  these 
documents had come alive when they were most needed. This claim curry's sensation. It casts me, who 
can make it, in rather un-fanciful light in the sense of putting an onerous  responsibility on me to explain 
how come the manuscripts were not made public when they should have had the implied impact. And 
what role I have played in their seeing or not seeing the light of day! This was actually what was 
demanded by a writer in The Sun newspapers in  2007 who argued that only I had claimed in public to 
know about the existence of the Ifeajuna manuscript and only President Olusegun Obasanjo by quoting 
generously from it in his book , Nzeogwu, had proved that he, among the well-placed,  knew about and 
could rely on the document. The writer had threatened that if President Obasanjo would not release the 
documents, I owed a responsibility to do so. 
I wish to be upfront with it: that  what has been known about the documents in Nigeria's public space 
largely surfaced as a result of decisions I had taken at one time or the other. As Bari Salau points out in 
his own preface to Awo on the Nigerian civil war, I was active in turning the Enugu transcripts into public 
property.  I should add that I was later responsible for the outings that the Ifeajuna Manuscript had, 
whether in Obasanjo's book or in newspaper wrangles in the past two decades.  Almost ritually, I  drew 
attention to the forgotten documents in my newspaper columns as Chairman of the Editorial Board of 
the now defunct Tempo magazine and in interviews granted to other print media and television houses. 
During the struggle over the annulment of the June 12 1993 elections, I placed enormous weight on the 
evidence of the manuscripts in attempting to correct some of what I regarded as the fictions of Nigeria's 
history. All the while, I found myself in a quandary however because I based my arguments on 
documents that were not public property.  They were like mystery documents that I seemed to be 
pulling out of my fez cap to mesmerize those who were not as privileged as I was. All the effort I had 
made did not appear sufficient or proficient enough to relieve me of the obligation to complete the 
circle of their full conversion into public property. It has been quite bothersome to see that the issues 
they contain remain ever heated and on the boil. They are issues that have stood in the way of due and 
necessary cooperation between Nigerians from different parts of the country. I happen to know that in 
some quarters, merely to mention knowledge of the existence of the documents is viewed as raking and 
scratching the wounds of the civil war. It is a preference, it seems, for the murky half-truths and out-
rightly contrived lies, much of them horrid residues of war propaganda, that have mauled our public 
space and ruined civic projects so irremediably since the war. Yet so insistent are the issues, so  
inexorable in everyday political discussions, so decisive in the sentiments expressed  across regional and 
ethnic lines, that to continue to let them fester in limbo is to be guilty of something close to intellectual 
treason.  
To meet the challenge of the propaganda, it has become necessary, in my view, to provide a natural 
history of the documents, first, as a performance in genealogies, to audit the processes through which 
the documents passed in order to arrive at where they are. I consider this important so that those who 
may wish to dispute their veracity can do so with fuller knowledge of  their odyssey. I am minded to 
distinguish between offending the sensitivities of those who shore up the myth of we never make 
mistakes, and others who simply wish for bygones to be bygones. As against  bygoners, I think a  country 
is unfortunate and ill-served when it carries a pernicious history on her back that has been garnished by 
rumour peddlers and fiction-mongers who may or may not derive any benefits from traducing the truth 
but have been too committed to a line that makes looking the truth in the face unappealing. To keep 
silent, or to shelve a corrective, in the face of such traducers, is almost churlish. It is certainly not 
enough to break the silence by outing the forgotten documents.  The way to begin to discharge the 
responsibility is to narrate how I came to know about and have followed the career of the two 
documents. 
To begin with, it was in Ruth First's book, Barrel of a Gun, that I first encountered hints about the 
existence of the Ifeajuna Manuscript. Ruth First was one of the most daring of the instant historians who 
took on the writing of post-independence Africa as the continent began to be mauled by those whom Ali 
Mazrui would describe as the militariat and who operated on an ethic that Wole Soyinka has described 
as the divine right of the gun. She, who was so determined to uncover the  roots of  the violence that 
was overtaking African politics, was fated to die later through a parcel bomb sent by dirty jobbers of her 
native Apartheid South Africa. Her narrative took on the insidious goings on behind the scenes in several 
coups across Africa at a time when the issues, participants and sites were still hazy. It was like looking 
ahead to a future that a free South Africa needed to avoid. In    a way, it prepared me to pay attention to 
the footnote to line 16 of JP Clark's  poem, ‘Return Home’ in his collection, Casualties, published in 1970. 
In the footnote, JP wrote:  “A number of papers. Major Ifeajuna left with me on the night of our arrival 
at Ikeja the manuscript of his account of the coup, which after due editing was rejected by the 
publishers as early as May 1966 because it was a nut without the kernel”.  This footnote made him post-
facto accessory to the coup as he could have been charged by one later-day military dictator down the 
road.  But how  did the manuscripts get to be handed over to JP? Which publishers rejected the 
manuscript? This was left to the grind of the rumour mill for decades. Nothing more authoritative on 
what happened came from JP Clark until twenty years later when in his Nigerian National Order of Merit 
Award lecture of December 5, 2001, serialized in the Guardian between 10th and 14th December 2001, 
he filled in a few more gaps. He said: “My main encounter with the military , however, was played off 
stage many years before that. In Casualties, my account in poetry of the Nigerian Civil War, so much 
misunderstood by my Ibo readers and their friends in quotes, I said at the time that I came so close to 
the events of 15 January 1966 that I was taken in for interrogation. Shinkafi was the officer, all 
professional, but very polite. Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna had given me his account of the coup to edit and 
arrange publication. The authorities thought I had it then in my custody”. JP does not quite say how the 
authorities knew. Or show that they knew where he kept it. 
My first inkling of what happened, regarding the Ifeajuna Manuscript, came to me as a result of a quirk 
in my biography that made me write a poem, The Poet Lied, which pitched me into the maw of an 
unwitting controversy on the wrong side of JP Clark. The Poet Lied, was part-response to the Nigerian 
crisis and civil war  dealing with a segment of the political class,  all those, including writers, politicians, 
religious leaders and soldiers -  who were in a position to change the images and symbols by which we 
interpreted our lives  but who flunked their roles during the civil war. JP Clark was riled by the poetic 
imputations, convinced that, as the poet agrees but not the poem, he was the one, or among the ones, 
satirized. He importuned my publishers, also his own publishers, Longman  UK, to withdraw the 
collection from the market. Or face dire consequences! It was in the course of negotiating with the 
publishers, between the UK office and the Nigerian branch, how not to withdraw the manuscript from 
the market that I ran into stories of how one manuscript proffered  by JP Clark had brought so much 
trouble to them two decades earlier. From bits and snippets in informal conversations, here and there, I 
got to know more about the Ifeajuna Manuscript which JP Clark sent to them to publish. As I gathered, 
the Longman office in Nigeria had sent the manuscript to Longman UK where it was seen as being too 
hot to handle. The multi-national, doing good business in Nigeria, did not want to antagonize a military 
dictatorship that had just come to power. The UK office therefore sent the manuscript to the Nigerian 
High commission office in London to find out if the manuscript would pass something of a civility test. 
The new High Commissioner to Britain happened to be Brigadier Ogundipe who had only just survived 
the counter coup of July 29, 1966 and had escaped to London. He was easily the most senior officer in 
the Nigerian Army and should rightly have become Head of State if it depended on seniority. Having just 
avoided untoward consequences for being so prominent, was he in a position to accede to the request? 
Brigadier Ogundipe simply caused the manuscript to be sent home to the authorities in Lagos. Zealously, 
the authorities marched on the Longman office in Ikeja and arrested the executives who had sent the 
manuscripts to the UK for publication. JP Clark, who brought the manuscript, could not be reached. Or 
so the Longman executives reported. But the military authorities knew what to do. As JP Clark would 
have it in his lecture: “An interesting development from my visit to the then Special Branch of the 
Nigeria Police Force at Force Headquarters was that my late friend, Aminu Abdulahi, fresh from 
assignments in London and Nairobi, moved in from his cousin, M.D. Yusufu, to live with me for a year 
and keep an eye on me. I have never discussed the matter with our inimitable master spy-catcher of 
those days. Some years later, he gave me the good advice that the state does not mind what a writer 
scribbles about it as long as he does not go on to put his words into action. 
As for the manuscript: “I have often wondered over the years what became of this manuscript that I 
kept at one time in a baby's cot. When the publisher Longman chickened out of the project, I handed it 
over to a brother-in-law of  Ifeajuna's to take home to his wife, Rose. I found portions of it later 
reproduced in General Olusegun Obasanjo's biography of Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu” 
JP rounds out his narrative thus: “My purpose of letting you into all this is to help fill in a few details left 
out in the history of military intervention in Nigeria. Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna is made the villain, while 
Major Chukuma Nzeogwu  is the hero. The portraits are not that black and white and far apart. They 
both killed their superior officers and a number of key political leaders in the country in a common 
cause. So where lies the difference? Where the distinction? I have always found it difficult to understand 
why one is made out a villain and the other a hero”. 
“After the events of the momentous day broke upon us all, and Major Ifeajuna was reported to have 
fled to Ghana, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi wanted to have him back as he had Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, 
Chris Okigbo was given the letter to take to President Kwame Nkrumah. But he needed company, 
someone who shared influential literary friends with him in Accra, but more importantly, someone who 
could add his voice to persuade Ifeajuna to come home and assume responsibility for his action. We 
knew the dangers of our assignment. 'JP, I cant bear a pin prick', Chris had laughed. Yet, when war came, 
he was  to take up arms and die for a new cause. Chris had in fact driven Emman, disguised as a girl, 
from Ibadan to the then Dahomey border, after he found his way back from Enugu a defeated man”. 
JP Clark does not say that he was in that party but readers of Soyinka's  memoirs YOU MUST SET FORTH 
AT DAWN,  would find on page 286-287 of the Nigerian edition, the following: “JP, I always suspected, 
did have a first-hand knowledge, albeit vague, of the very first coup de'tat of 1966. With Christopher 
Okigbo, he had accompanied one of the principals  Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna  across the border, the 
latter in female disguise. JP turned back at the border while Christopher  crossed over to the Republic of 
Benin (then Dahomey) taking charge of Ifeajuna who was by then virtually an emotional wreck, haunted  
Christopher related  by images of bloodstreams cascading from his dying victims, his superior officers, 
none of whom was a stranger to him”. Soyinka adds: “JP brought back with him the manuscript of 
Ifeajuna's account of the coup, hurriedly put together during this period of hiding by that young major 
and former athlete  he was one of the four who set a joint 6'6 record in high jump at the 
Commonwealth Games in Vancouver, 1956. Knowledge of the existence of the manuscript set off a wild 
hunt by Gowon's Military Intelligence, desperate for an authentic, first-hand account of those who had 
plotted the '66 coup, who had done the killings, what civilians, especially politicians, had prior 
knowledge or had collaborated in the putsch. For a while JP Clark was deemed a security risk. So were 
his publishers, Longmans, whose editors at one time or the other held the explosive manuscript in their 
possession, debating the wisdom of releasing its contents into the market”. 
JP's account in his National Merit Award lecture unpacks the mystery further. He writes: “We took two 
trips to Accra by air, the first was a full meeting with Ifeajuna, the second to give his host government 
time to arrange for evacuation, while he wrote up the defence he would have given at his court-martial 
in Lagos. We just made it back before Ghana, too, fell to the military. I still wonder what effect the 
example of Nigeria had upon them. Nkrumah for all his revolutionary fervour , did not know what to do 
with Major Ifeajuna. He, therefore sent him to his army for debriefing, and they advised the president 
against giving him the airplane he asked for to return to Lagos to finish his operation. 
JP continues: “The man could not understand what had happened in Nigeria, Ifeajuna, told us. So he 
packed off his unexpected guest to Winneba to be with his compatriots, SG. Ikoku and Dr. Bankole 
Akpata. With both these ideologues, our stay with Ifeajuna became one running seminar. What became 
clear was that it was not the Nigerian Army that seized power on January 15, 1966. It was a faction of it, 
racing against another to secure power for the political alliance of their choice. This group was for UPGA. 
It beat the other one to the gun, the faction in full support of the governing NNA alliance. That Ifeajuna 
said, explained the pattern of targets and killings”. 
JP Clark said he had asked Ifeajuna at Accra: “Did the General know about your plan?” 
“Well, not really, I was just a Brigade Major, and you don't always get that close to a General. But I 
remember on some of those briefings on the situation in the West , when I said it couldn't go on forever 
like that, he growled that we junior officers should not go and start anything foolish”. 
“And the President away on his Caribbean cruise” 
“But you know the politicians were all wooing the army” he said, “Our plan was to bring Chief Awolowo 
out of jail in Calabar to head our government and break up the country into more states to make for a 
true federation”. 
I have taken the pains to be over-generous with these quotes because they provide an interesting 
preface to Chinua Achebe's take on it.  As narrated by Ezenwa Ohaeto, Achebe's biographer, the 
Ifeajuna manuscript was one of those which came to Citadel Press, the wartime outfit that Christopher 
Okigbo suggested that they set up. Achebe had said: “…well, you set it up, you know about it, and I'll 
join. He said, You'll be chairman and I'll be Managing Director, so the Citadel Press was formed. The 
name came from the idea of the fortress  you flee from a foreign land, in danger, and return home to 
your citadel”. 
Christopher Okigbo avidly solicited manuscripts for the publishing house. As Ohaeto writes: “Okigbo also 
brought another manuscript to Citadel Press which was from Emmanuel Ifeajuna, one of the plotters of 
the 15 January 1966 coup. The manuscript was Ifeajuna's story of the coup and he gave it to Okigbo who 
enthusiastically passed it on to Achebe after reading it. It was a work that Achebe considered important 
so he also read it immediately. But he discovered that there were flaws in the story. He criticized it for 
two reasons: It seemed to me to be self-serving. Emmanuel was attempting a story in which he was a 
centre and everybody else was marginal. So  he was the star of the thing. I did not know what they did 
or did not but reading his account in the manuscript, I thought that the author was painting himself as a 
hero”. 
“The other reason was quite serious, as Achebe explains: '…. within the story itself there were 
contradictions'. Achebe told Okigbo that it was not a reliable and honest account of what happened. As 
an example, he cited Ifeajuna's description of the coup plotters at their first meeting in a man's chalet in 
a catering guest house. The plotters are coming into the chalet late in the night and Ifeajuna describes 
the room as being in darkness since they are keen not to arouse suspicion. They all assemble and 
Ifeajuna claims that he stood up and addressed them while watching their faces and noting their 
reactions. Since it is supposed to be dark, Achebe regarded that description as dubious. Okigbo laughed 
and remarked that Ifeajuna was probably being lyrical. Some days after that conversation, Okigbo came 
to Achebe and told him that Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu had asked him: 'I hear you and Achebe are 
going to publish Emma's lies?'. That comment by Nzeogwu, a principal actor in the January coup, 
confirmed that the manuscript was unreliable.' 
Times were to turn disastrous for many of those actors before the end of 1967. In later years, Achebe 
reflected that he might have made a different decision if he had known what lay ahead for Ifeajuna, 
Okigbo and Nzeogwu. He added, however, that even if the manuscript had been accepted by Citadel 
Press, it would not have been published, because the publishing house was destroyed at the same time 
as these three men when the war moved closer”. 
There are reasons to believe that the Citadel encounter was not the first in which Chinua Achebe was 
rejecting the document. The relationship between Christopher Okigbo and Chinua Achebe was at all 
times during this period so close that it is not conceivable that Okigbo could have failed to brief him 
about the dynamite that JP brought from Ifeajuna. Besides, as Editorial Adviser to Heinemann, Achebe 
was sufficiently close to the publishing mill and the burgeoning literati not to have heard about the 
manuscript. Arguably, it is unlikely that Chinua Achebe was seeing the manuscript for the first time in 
Biafra. He was too much in the same circles with Okigbo in his many schemes and with JP Clark at the 
University of Lagos, not to  have been aware of the document that Okigbo and JP Clark brought with 
Ifeajuna from Accra. However, whenever it was that Chinua Achebe saw the manuscript, the issue is 
whether his editorial judgment had anything to do with the document not seeing the light of day. 
What is known of it from his biographer's narration does not make Achebe culpable. Achebe's position 
on the manuscript could still be faulted  however on the grounds that even an unreliable story told by a 
major actor in an event of such earth-shaking proportions in the history of a young nation-state, 
deserved to be known. How many stories of the civil war today are without the self-serving disposition 
of their narrators? Talking about unreliability, Chinua Achebe may have been reading the manuscript 
from what he knew of Ifeajuna's famed capacity for not standing, in his college days, by what he had 
done, as even JP, his finest defender has narrated. Or, perhaps, there were things those great writers did 
not tell themselves even in their closeness. For instance JP. Clark is reported by Ohaeto to have 
exclaimed after reading the advance copy of Achebe's A man of the people : 'Chinua, I know you are a 
prophet. Everything in this book has happened except a military coup'.  There is no way of knowing, until 
their memoirs, whether either of them was aware of the rumour, soon  entrenched by later events, that  
Nnamdi Azikiwe had been sounded out by Igbo officers, Ojukwu specifically, on carrying out a coup 
during the 1964 election crisis.   Azikiwe  had refused. That rumour is in the same class as the other one: 
that, tipped off by Ifeajuna before the January 15, 1966 coup, Zik went on a health cruise in the 
Carribbean under the auspices of Haiti's Papa Doc, an old schoolmate. All the same, if  Chinua Achebe 
did not know about the rumour, he certainly was well placed enough to have known that Nnamdi 
Azikiwe had refused to call on Balewa to form a Government in 1964 because the election was rigged. 
Azikiwe had written a long speech, published in an early edition of his newspaper, the West African 
Pilot, explaining why he would not call on the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, to form a government. 
And then another emergency edition was published later in the day in which he wrote another speech 
calling on the Prime Minister to form a government. The Great Zik had virtually been put under house 
arrest by the British Commander of the Nigerian Army, Welby Everard. Discovering that the army would 
not obey their commander in chief, Zik capitulated. His capitulation was facilitated by the whispering 
campaign that it was only two medical opinions that were  required to prove him unfit to take a 
decision. As Dudley footnoted in his Introduction to Nigerian Politics, “The President gave way when he 
realized there was a move to declare him medically incapable of continuing in office”. (p.312)As I have 
argued in newspaper articles, this was the very first coup in Nigeria's post-independence history. It was 
the Rubicon crossed after which every Nigerian political party had to build and flex a military muzzle in 
anticipation of a long expected blow up. 
This is the point in the narrative where questions are usually raised about the Awolowo factor: whether 
he was privy to what the coup makers planned to do with him. Easily dismissed but not scorched is that 
the soldiers had good reasons for wanting Awolowo above all other living politicians in the country at 
that time. There was a FREE AWO movement into which even political opponents had plugged for 
relevance. Since Awolowo began to suffer the series of house arrests and detentions, before the 
eventual jail term was confirmed by the Supreme Court,  his voice, which consistently defended the 
poor and the underprivileged had been missing in national affairs. Younger radicals remembered 
Awolowo's opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, his consistent defence of the rule of law, his 
unflagging pursuit of social welfare policies against the economics of waste which characterized the 
capitalist road that Nigeria was taking, and the general slowness in responding to the struggle in the rest 
of Africa to eliminate colonialism and set Africa free. The Hansards of the Federal House of 
representatives in Lagos reveal the valiant efforts that Awolowo had made to change the street-beggar 
economy that Nigeria ran, his opposition to undiluted private enterprise, and his general resistance to 
the various attempts, to sell a newspaper gag law, a preventive detention act, and the general de-
federalization of the country. Anyone knowing these would not be surprised that the younger radicals in 
the country were on Awolowo's side. Awolowo himself had brought in many young radical elements like 
SG Ikoku, Bola Ige, Samuel Aluko, Oluwasanmi, Bankole Akpata and others to his side who were 
generally viewed as socialists involved in creating a better future for the country.  This is what Ojukwu 
means when he says that Awolowo was a hero. The circle of young radicals were enthused by the 
presence of Segun Awolowo, just returned from law studies in Britain, who was fresh air in the circles in 
which Awolowo was seen as a brand to be emulated. Segun's death in a motor accident during his trials 
won his father the sympathy of this younger generation.  The most well known poets in Nigeria, Wole 
Soyinka, Christopher Okigbo and JP Clark wrote poems at that time that have served as witnesses to 
travails of the man and his times. The poets belonged to  a small circle of radical intellectuals in the 
country who knew one another in the University College Ibadan (UCI) and shared a common, energized, 
notion of a country that would move the world. In spite of the ethnic fractionalization that was a 
permanent feature of life in Nigeria’s public space, the young Turks of the period were parleying across 
occupational and ethnic lines. It is not clear how much they shared in a political sense. The question may 
be asked: how many of them were notionally privy to the idea of a coup – the one supposedly being 
planned by Awolowo or, later, the one that was supposed to be in the offing after Ojukwu sounded out 
Nnamdi Azikiwe about one during the election crisis in 1964? 
What may be argued with some certainty is that many of them could see that there was a plot to expose 
and destroy the Action Group, the ruling party in the Western Region. The plot had begun with the 
declaration of a state of emergency in the Region, the setting up of the Coker Commision of Enquiry to 
prove corruption in the management of AG's company, the NIPC, so that the Federal government could 
seize the assets of the company; and then the institution of a treasonable felony trial to settle the 
question of the party’s survival once and for all. Later, the plot covered the establishment of the Banjo 
Commission to prove the failure of free education, Awolowo's most sensational contribution to 
development in the country and the star performance that made his party so impregnable in the West. 
In spite of, or because of, the underhand methods that were being used to drown out Awolowo, anyone 
who cared to look could tell that he was more sinned against than sinning. In  particular, regarding the 
1962 treasonable felony trial, involving him and 27 others, any objective observer could have seen that 
what Awolowo had done apart from organizing a political party was being a thorn in the flesh of the 
independence government. In the face of the evident plans to destroy his party so that the coalition 
partners could chop up its remains, he had vowed that he and his party would make the West 
ungovernable rather than let the region be taken outside the electoral process. His party began to train 
people to make sure that no undemocratic victories would befall the region. The party sent apparatchiks  
to Ghana to train. So the accusation during the treasonable felony trial, that they were sending guerillas 
for training in Ghana was correct in so far as it was not stretched to imply that it was pursuant to 
carrying out a coup against the government of the Federation. What is generally ignored by the 
narrators of this segment of Nigeria’s story, in spite of the admission of its truth by critical participants, 
is that every Nigerian political party at that time was training toughs for armed struggle. It may be a 
secret to those who never bothered to look at what was happening outside the newspapers. This is 
backhandedly confirmed by Tanko Yakasai in his recent autobiography where he retails an added 
dimension that  NEPU pro-insurgents were in league with a Camerounian political party in sending 
activists for training in Eastern Europe. This should of course be understood against the background of 
the struggle in the North between NPC's thugs -  'Jam'iyyar Mahaukata’, ‘Sons of madmen'-  who wore 
wooden or 'akushi' hats, described in Allan Feinstein's African Revolutionary as having “semi-official 
sanction to fight against southern dominance”. They “subsequently extended their terrorism to a group 
of NEPU adherents' so that 'NEPU retaliated with a “Positive Action Wing” (PAW) who wore 'calabash 
helmets' and were determined to resist the NPC's routine assaults that saw candidates of the opposition 
jailed or killed, their houses and farms destroyed and, in the case of opposition parties from the south, 
whole city wide or region-wide riots organized to distance them from power. NEPU went beyond a PAW 
response to the Mahaukata. The party, as Tanko Yankasai authoritatively reveals, already had 
experience in the training of guerillas for the Camerounian Sawaba Party(p.209). 
In relation to the South, the NPC idea was actually quite fundamentalist because it was primed by the 
conception of a National Army as a catchment of thugs for realizing partisan ends. The truth of this can 
now be checked against the testimonies of  several NPC stalwarts. They had sent several of their young 
men into the Nigerian Army to prepare for the day when the military would be needed to settle political 
scores. Evidently, the parties in coalition at the Federal level were neither true to one another nor to 
themselves. They saw the destruction  of the Action Group differently.  They who were busy organizing 
insurgents against other parties and using even the state apparatus to realize partisan goals needed to 
hide their activities by accusing the opposition of treason. According to Dudley, the NCNC wished that 
the Action Group be destroyed so that they, the only member of the coalition that had a foothold in the 
West, would inherit the West and then confront the North with a Southern solidarity. After Awolowo 
was jailed in 1962, NCNC strategists actually tried to swallow up the West by forming a coalition with the 
Akintola faction of the AG which had become the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). They did 
not reckon with the ingenuity of that doughty fighter, the Are Ona Kankanfo himself. He saw the score 
quickly. He preferred an alliance with the senior partner in the coalition, the NPC. It was only after failing 
with the NNDP that the NCNC came back to the AG, this time, in search of a foothold rather than a 
routing. The Action Group leader, in prison, advised his followers to coast along until it became obvious 
that the NCNC was more interested in power at the centre and would not like to lose the perks from the 
coalition in the Federal House. By the time the Western Regional election of 1965 was rigged, the Action 
Group had formalized an organizational prong that enabled the members, at large, to fulfill the old 
promise by their leader: rather than for the West to be taken over by undemocratic means, the region 
would be made ungovernable. This was proficiently achieved with the Wetie riots – dousing opponents 
with petrol to aid match flare - that gave the sobriquet of the WildWild West to the region. 
Of course, at the point of the region-wide riots, it was clear that the two coalition partners, working 
together for  the  destruction of the AG would have to re-strategize. Although sharing power at the 
Federal level, they nevertheless worked against each other everywhere else. The NPC had planned to 
use its men in the national army  for a coup that would clear the nation of the insurgents in the West 
and in the Middle Belt, especially in Tivland, where there was an active guerilla war against the 
government. Meanwhile, by 1964, the UMBC had  joined with NEPU to carry out a Northern liberation of 
sorts before facing the Federal behemoth. They all however joined the United Progressive Grand 
Alliance, UPGA, whose game, with the NCNC as  the core-party, was to go for broke. There seemed to be 
a consensus across the country, and in every political party, that the crisis could only be resolved 
through violence. All the political parties were primed for it. 
In a country, so wired for armed struggle, there was bound to be very little room for the truth to have 
dominion. What had to be done through the law courts, as the Action Group would discover, was  very 
much a charade. Awolowo was convicted on the ground that he was so over-weaningly ambitious that 
although he was not specifically found guilty, his fingerprints could be read on all the events that were 
to culminate in a coup. The judges, to prove the vaulting nature of the ambitions, took judicial notice of 
the dreams that Awolowo had recorded in a notebook which he called Flashes of Inspiration. It must be 
one of the unique court cases in history in which a man was jailed for what he said he saw in a dream 
rather than what he actually did. Nigeria had simply become a country seeded by and overcome by 
paranoia, an atmosphere of psychological block, making it difficult to look at opponents with any 
objectivity. The tendency was to accept every charge as true, the more heinous the better, if directed at 
someone about whom something good is not supposed to be said. So the charge of treasonable felony 
was swallowed hook and line without the minimum application of gumption. As it turned out, and as 
Obasanjo has told the story, Chukwuma Nzeogwu was the intelligence officer who was attached to the 
efforts to unravel the veracity of the charges in the Coker Commission and Treasonable Felony trial. He 
was obviously privy to the discovery made by the Coker Commission that Awolowo kept a good account: 
that he had more money before he became a Premier of western Region than he had in his account 
after eight years of living in his own house, not in the state house, and spending his own money on 
entertainment. Even when Kwame Nkrumah visited Nigeria on a state visit,  the Ghanaian President 
stayed in Awolowo's house at Oke Ado in Ibadan. Not in any state house. Thus, there is every reason to 
assume that Nzeogwu had enough information about the man’s distance from the common run of 
politicians in the country for Awolowo to be raised above the slough of general discussions and 
brickbats. What cannot be established is whether the coup makers ever made an attempt to contact 
Awolowo in jail.  From Ifeajuna's account, the coup makers were quite dubious about Awolowo's 
support. They had therefore decided that if they released him and he failed to be their leader, they 
would lock him up in the state house and issue decrees in his name. Quite glaring in the so-called master 
plan is that the coup makers were horridly naïve and permutative. So much so that about the senior 
officers Ifeajuna writes: “some of our senior officers who were likely to fight on the side of the regime 
were to be arrested while action took place. We also had to watch the concentration of senior officials . 
Only those who resisted arrest or fired at troops were to be fired at. When action was completed and a 
new regime was set up, they were to be released and given appointments, but not necessarily related to 
what posts they held before the event. We were to present our General with a 'fait accompli'. We were 
to apologize to him for our actions and request him to join us and take over the plans. If he was not 
prepared to join us, we would request that he should leave us alone to complete it. And in that case we 
were to appeal to the officer next in line to come to our help”(70). This sounds like the view of an officer 
and gentleman who expected the behaviour of others to be determined by his view of human nature 
rather than by the exigencies on the ground. Ifeajuna as much as lends credence to the charge that 
Nnamdi Azikiwe was  tipped off  to go on a health cruise so that he would not be around during the 
action. He writes: “We were to  act before the ex-President returned from his trip to Europe and his 
carousing cruise to the Caribbean. This,  for two reasons. Firstly, we were certain that he would put up a 
fight against us. Not that this mattered: but as the head of state he could easily call in foreign troops. In 
his absence only the Prime Minister could do so. And so the number of persons to invite foreign troops 
was reduced from two to one. Second reason was that , if he returned, we had to deal with him. But the 
task of clearing his residence at the state house would require more troops than we could conveniently 
muster.” 
So did he nudge the President to exit while they plotted?  He wrote: 
“We considered that two VIPs would be of importance to us in controlling the nation. If our General 
agreed to come with us, then he could rest in charge of the army or he could be head of state. He was 
acceptable to most officers and men. We would have to appeal to him. We knew that without him it 
would be difficult to hold the country. 
“We also believed that Chief Obafemi Awolowo had become recognized as the rallying point of our 
nation. If we attempted any set-up without him, we could quite easily end up opposed by the relatively 
progressive political parties. For him therefore we had the post of executive president or Prime Minister 
depending on the reaction of our General. But we were also afraid that he could refuse to accept power 
handed over to him by us. There was the possibility of this highly principled man refusing to come out of 
jail to assume the highest post in the land. I took care of this. We were to go to him and explain the facts 
and appeal to him. We planned to bring him into Lagos by air before noon on 15 January. If he refused 
to leave jail, he was to be ordered to do so. As a prisoner he had no choice. We were to transfer him to 
the State House and if he still refused, we were to hold him here and inform him that this was his new 
gaol house! Meanwhile we planned to get the elders of the state to help us get him to agree. If in the 
end he refused, he was to be held and decrees were to be issued in his name”. 
Surely, part of the naivity of the coup makers, or the mis-interpretation of their wishes by their failed 
coup-leader,  is that they hoped to set up a cabinet of civil servants and abolish the Federal system of 
government. “We had made a selection of fifteen civil servants from all over the country, all of them 
available on call in the federal civil service. We planned to abolish the federal system of government and 
get back to the military system. The country was to be broken up into fifteen provinces. In each province 
there was to be a military governor and a head of administatration. The regions were to start winding up 
themselves by handing over at once minor functions to the new provinces. On the other hand, major 
functions of the regions were at once to be taken over by the government in Lagos”. That is, in effect, 
they would get out of prison a man who went to jail for seeking to entrench Federalism and ask him to 
run a military system, more or less a unitary system. Although the immediate creation of provinces 
would have mollified Awolowo and many of those who later joined in the revenge coup, there was 
evident naivety, if not suicidal predisposition in coup makers'  waffling on the question of Federalism or 
unitarism.  
At any rate, according to information vouchsafed after the coup,  they had to act to upstage the plans of 
the Northern People's Congress (NPC) which was to have sent soldiers to the Western Region on January 
17, 1966 to deal with the insurgents in the Western Region. When Western Premier Akintola left the 
NPC leader, Sir Ahmadu Bello on the 14th of January and jetted homewards to Ibadan, he was certain 
that the deal was fool-proof  until the Five Majors of January 15, 1966 struck. Lets grant the benefit of 
the doubt: that Awolowo would have been released immediately on January 15, 1966 but for those who 
hijacked the coup from the five majors. Or was it simply taken over from, or handed over by, the five 
majors?   As the narrative goes, the officer detailed to fly Awolowo to Lagos from Calabar already had 
his brief. But it never happened. Ojukwu, in effective control of Kano had already scuttled any plan that 
could take off from what could have become a Kano front. After he was made military Governor of the 
East, he had urgent matters to attend to which could not have put Awolowo on the agenda. So there is 
no point disputing his claim that be signed a warrant for the release of the prisoner. It was clearly not 
agreed that the warrant should be executed.  Imaginably, a government that moved quickly to enact a 
Unitary Decree could not have been in a hurry to release a sworn Federalist from jail. The question is: if 
Ojukwu signed the warrant, how did the effectuation of the warrant wait for so long until it coincided 
with the order given by Lt.Col Yakubu Gowon at the head of the revenge coup, for Awolowo to be 
released? This is an important question because  Awolowo was not released until seven months after 
the first coup of the year. The historic task fell upon the revenge coup makers who had toppled General 
Aguiyi Ironsi after  a rigorously organized  pogrom against the Igbo, with a number of other Southerners 
added to the kill. It was certainly to gain a wider base than their Northern  security ambitions allowed 
that  the release of Awolowo from Calabar Prison was announced. It leaves a sneaking feeling that 
Ojukwu's powers over the Eastern Region, to which all Igbo in the Nigerian diaspora had to return in 
search of a safe haven,  had not yet become so all-pervasive as to be able to countermand a swiftly 
executed decision by Federal authorities intent on releasing Awolowo from jail.  Nor would it have been 
politic for Ojukwu, even if he had the power, to attempt to prevent Awolowo from being released after 
a Federal order to that effect. It would have amounted to holding Awolowo hostage. Could it be said 
then that in order not to fall into the role of hostage taker, Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, as Military 
Governor of the Eastern Region carried out an order initiated by a Federal Military Government that he 
had so flagrantly repudiated?  Whatever is the case, it was the release that enabled Awolowo to 
participate in the discussions to resolve the crisis through sundry Leaders of Thought Meetings up till 
Awolowo’s peace-hunt to Enugu before the first shot in the Civil war was fired. 
It may well be added that it was Awolowo's participation in Gowon's administration that enabled him to 
get a copy of the Ifeajuna manuscript. A copy was sent to him by a well-wisher who thought he should 
know about the plans that the January 15 1966 coup makers had had in store for him. It was in similar 
fashion that he got a copy of the transcripts of the Enugu meeting after the tapes were said to have 
been captured at the fall of Enugu and the take over of the Eastern Nigerian Broadcasting service by 
Federal Forces. Awolowo had the two documents in safe keeping when I became his Private (Political) 
Secretary in June 1978.  They were among the many papers, not part of the main body of his library, 
which he had to bring out for my education to help my work as his  “involved and committed 
researcher”, as he requested for in his newspaper advert for the job.  I read the documents as part of 
many such efforts to induct me into the job. I was authorized to make copies for a number of party 
officials and stalwarts as a means of education in preparation for the battles that the newly formed 
Unity Party of Nigeria was expected to face in the Second Republic. So let me put it  this way: that I read 
the full text of the Ifeajuna manuscript within three months of my new job. The other document, the 
transcript of his meeting with Ojukwu, was a typescript that had to be cyclostyled in order for many 
more copies to be made in preparation for the controversies that we expected to confront in the course 
of the 1979 election. Although there were quite a few brickbats during that election, not much came 
that required the appeal to the documents. But Awolowo always wanted to have the documents made 
public. He hadn't thought of releasing them before the election because he did not want to draw 
attention to the false charges at the treasonable felony trials. We did not think the period of election 
was the best period to do so especially one which he thought to be critical for a man of seventy who 
may never have another chance. The dubious value of letting the world know that coup-makers had 
latched upon him as the saviour they were looking for could have had a double-edged impact with a 
capacity for damage that may not have been easy to control. After the election, however, there was no 
more need for such caution. That was when Ebenezer Babatope who had always rooted for it as a job 
for his friend Arthur Nwankwo of Fourth Dimension, publisher of his own Coups and the Barracks Revolt, 
was authorized to send a copy to the Fourth Dimension for publication. Unfortunately, as Babatope 
reported it later, Arthur Nwankwo said  Ifeajuna's family was not in favour of the publication. 
Thereafter, little was done to bring the document to public attention. And, that was how the matter 
died. Except that I, who had been instrumental to having Awolowo bring out the document could not 
forget what I had read. Whenever I was confronted by a Nigerian argument which required using the 
materials from the manuscript to clear the ground, I used it. Especially in my rather longish articles for 
TheNews magazine during the June 12 Struggle, from 1993 to 1999, I took special notice of the 
arguments in the manuscripts in my responses to those who deployed old fictions to seek to undermine 
the geo-ethnic  reality at work in the annulment of the election.  
Actually, after I stopped being Chief Awolowo's private Secretary, Kole Omotoso who frequently shared 
what he has called my 'lived-in library'  at Seriki Aro in Ikeja  while he was writing his book Just Before 
Dawn, brought the manuscript of Obasanjo's Nzeogwu to my attention. It was a rather flimsy affair  
which he said he had been given by Professor Jide Osuntokun of the University of Lagos for a pre-
publication assessment. I read through it at one sitting and told him it was a disgrace for Obasanjo, a 
former Head of State, to be offering such a flimsy fare about the best celebrated soldier in the history of 
coup-making in Nigeria. As the closest friend to Nzeogwu, virtually sharing the same bed with him on 
the night before the January 15 coup, he was expected to know enough about him to fill a full-length 
book. If he had nothing to write, I said, he should go after the letters that they once exchanged, the 
articles written in whatever magazine at school or wherever, and whatever snippets they could get from 
all the history books about the man. I proposed that he should at least avail himself of the reasons given 
by Emmanuel Ifeajuna in the manuscript that has been going from hand to hand without finding a 
publisher. At the mention of Ifeajuna's manuscript, Kole Omotoso insisted that I had to talk to Jide 
Osuntokun myself. So I followed him to the Staff quarters in the University of Lagos where I told the 
Professor without too much preamble what I had told Kole. I also told him that I had a copy of the 
manuscript in safe-keeping, but that I would not give it to him. If Obasanjo was serious about the 
manuscript, I said, he knew where to find one; that is, if he didn't already have a copy. In the end, 
although I cannot now tell where he found the copy that he quoted from, and fairly generously in the 
published text, I am only too glad that he caused all those letters to be published which are today some 
of the source materials for anyone interested in assessing Nzeogwu's personality and character. Of 
course, the book,  Nzeogwu, landed Obasanjo in a controversy that led to his being openly criticized in 
public by his former deputy, retired Major General Shehu Musa Yar'adua.   The lands he had acquired  in 
some parts of the North were threatened with seizure as a punitive measure for his writing about the 
soldier whom many Northerners considered a villain. 
In a sense, I would say that I have Obasanjo to thank for  the confidence I have had in talking about the 
Ifeajuna manuscript. Obasanjo's use of the manuscript proved it that the copy that I had kept away was 
not fake. Whether its content was reliable or not, the point is that the soldier who wrote it had put 
enough of himself, true or false, into it for Nigerians to know what he wished that we know about the 
coup that he led. What he wished may have been false but it was unthinkable  for a country not to want 
to know what a man who had done so much to transform its history had to say. It has nothing to do with 
the sensitivities of his family. In any case, forty years after, all the millions murked up by the January 15 
coup that paved the way for all the succeeding military interventions in Nigeriá's history, deserve to 
know what he had to say for himself and his colleagues. Of interest is that in spite of the famed 
unreliability of Ifeajuna, none of the narratives written about the Nigerian crisis by the principal 
protagonists  Alexander Madiebo,   Ademoyega, Ben Ghulie, and Hilary Njoku have differed in any 
substantial sense apart from turns of phrases, from the core of what Ifeajuna wrote in the white hot 
heat of the moment that followed the coup. The contentious issue over their choice of Awolowo has 
been repeated by the participants in the core group that set out to change the government before they 
were overtaken by Ironsi, and the echelon that surrounded Ojukwu in Kano who would not allow 
Nzeogwu to make use of troops in that city to march on Lagos as he had planned to do after he 
discovered that the coup was botched in the South. It is a matter for historical counterfactuals what the 
history of Nigeria would have been like if Nzeogwu had not capitulated but had mustered enough will 
and force to organize a Northern Army that would march upon Lagos from Kaduna. His collapse into the 
maw of the ethnic mush that had overtaken the coup was the Nigerian equivalent of the seppuku which 
he was obliged to commit if he were a Samurai in the Japanese army. What happened to the coup 
makers thereafter including the fact that those who benefited from the coup were unwilling to put them 
on trial is part of the story that must also have made it difficult to publish Ifeajuna's manuscript. 
For that matter, what Nzeogwu called “Emman's lies” did not have to be true to see the light of day. 
There was a good enough reason to know that although Ifeajuna was Igbo-speaking and many said he 
was close enough to Azikiwe to tip him off about the impending coup, he took a scathing swipe at the 
former President of Nigeria in a manner that was itself some  “history” worthy of the record. Nzeogwu's 
opinion of Ifeajuna's incompetence in carrying out the coup is undubitably right on the mark. But it does 
not invalidate what Ifeajuna had to say. In fact, from hindsight, it can be claimed that what Nzeogwu 
said on coup day about their intentions was largely corroborated by Ifeajuna's manuscript.  That it 
should have taken so long for it to make its debut between covers is to say the least a national tragedy. 
The tragedy, it must be said, was egged by the fact that those who hijacked the coup from the five 
majors did not want the story out because they obviously did not want to identify with the views 
expressed in it. For the more ethnically inclined ones, the very idea that true sons of the Igbo carried out 
a coup and wanted to hand it over to Awolowo, a man they regarded as an enemy of their ethnic group, 
was simply the height of the absurd. To  the makers of the July 29 Revenge coup, it would have scuttled 
their much haggled presumption that it was an Igbo coup. Either way, the manuscript had not a chance. 
The other forgotten document of the civil had a better chance but its absence from circulation for a long 
time,  was no less a tragedy. It was supposedly captured among other tapes of the Biafran Broadcasting 
Corporation when Enugu fell to Federal troops. The tapes were transcribed with glee, according to 
Awolowo, by those who thought it would finally nail him for the agreement he reached with Ojukwu to 
have the Western Region  secede with the East as Radio Biafra never stopped insisting. As it turned out 
no such thing, is to be found in the tapes. Rather Awolowo was making a passionate plea for the 
continuance of Nigeria as a single political entity. He repeated some of his bitterest criticisms of the 
North and Northern leaders but he believed that it was possible to manage the differences between 
Nigerians if ethnic groups and regions enjoyed more autonomy. This was simply a parrot cry of his 
which, as those familiar with his campaigns and his books, especially  Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution 
and The People's Republi, would know, required a common welfare policy in education, health, and 
employment,  to unite all the ethnic groups. He was too old he said to abandon all the dreams he had 
had for his country. Nor would he like to come to the East with a passport. His solution, which obviously 
did not get down well with Ojukwu was for  Ojukwu to agree for the Eastern Region to come to a 
national conference and to support the creation of states as a basis for a Federal system free of the 
hegemony that the North had over the rest of the country; and all the regions in the country had over 
the minorities. If Ojukwu agreed, he believed, he had enough influence with the minorities of the Middle 
Belt and in the South to urge a shared positioning with the East and the West for a common stand in 
opposition to hegemonists in the North who would not want states created. It turned out  that Ojukwu 
did not want states to be created. That was the sticking point. 
It must have seemed to the Easterners who had been so overdosed by myths about Awolowo's hatred 
of the East  that he was merely trying out the old animosities in the garb of a pacifier  trying to win, by 
other means, the battles he had always pursued in Nigerian politics. The bottomline is that Ojukwu and 
Awolowo did not reach an agreement. Their positions in spite of the  parliamentary language in which 
they were couched were fundamentally at variance. Not to forget: it used to be taken as apocryphal by 
all, except core Awoists, that Ojukwu actually  came to see him in the guest house on the last night after 
the day's plenary. He wanted  a one on one with Awolowo. Understandably, Awolowo refused a one on 
one. Soyinka has now retailed in his autobiography, YOU MUST SET FORTH AT DAWN,(131-132) what 
Awolowo told him: 
“The 1967 eve of secession delegation of national public figures authorized by Yakubu Gowon, to 
dialogue with Eastern leadership had been led by Obafemi Awolowo, and the formal, well-publicised 
meeting between the two sides lasted nearly all day. The Easterners listed their grievances and 
demands, spoke with all apparent seriousness, and saw their guests off to their chalets. Late that same 
night however, Awolowo was disturbed by a knock on the door. 
It was the Eastern leader, Ojukwu, himself. He admitted that he had waited till late into the night so as 
to be able to speak to Awolowo in strictest privacy. Sure, said Awolowo, but he also insisted that at least 
one or two persons join him. That was agreed, and Awolowo called up the adjoining chalet, woke up the 
Police commissioner for the Western Region, Olufunwa, and a close political aide. 
Accompanying Ojukwu was a small team that included a Professor of History from the University of 
Ibadan who had fled, like other Easterners, to their beleaguered state. Years afterwards, during the 
struggle against the Abacha dictatorship, the same don introduced himself to me at  a meeting in the 
United States in 1996,  and revealed his participation at the nocturnal meeting of thirty years earlier. His 
account was a consistent and detailed confirmation of what Awolowo confided in me that afternoon. 
 
  
 
Odumegwu Ojukwu's mission was unambiguous, Awolowo said to me. “The young man had come to 
inform me that the East had decided on secession, and that there was no going back. All that was left 
was the announcement of a date. He said, “Sir, I have not come to argue, but to inform you. It has been 
decided”. 
   
 
“It was clear that any discussion was futile”, Awolowo continued , “Äfter all, we had done nothing but 
talk all day. Ojukwu confessed that he had agreed to meet the delegation at all only out of respect for 
my person. Biafra had already taken a decision”. 
“I was not surprised”, the Chief admitted. “I did one thing, though, I made one request of him  in fact, I 
insisted on it. I said to Ojukwu  at least, let us in the West  - I, specifically - have a minimum of two weeks 
notice before you announce the decision. And he promised. Yes, he promised me that much”. 
I hesitated, but could not resist asking: “Why two weeks? You told him you needed two weeks - to do 
what? 
Awolowo gave one of his enigmatic smiles, “You know Olufunwa, the Police Commissioner?”. 
I nodded Yes. 
“Well, apart from me, he is the only one who knows the answer to that question. And he's not likely to 
tell you either”. 
I did not press him. 
Hardly had Awolowo's delegation settled back into Federal territory than Ojukwu declared an 
Independent State of Biafra. The date was May 30, 1967. A short while after, Chief Awolowo accepted to 
serve as Commissioner of Finance under Yakubu Gowon. 
The Federal Government had however made a pre-emptive move. On May 27, Gowon abolished all four 
regions and split the nation into twelve new states. This achieved the goal of dangling before the entities 
that were newly carved out from the East, the attraction of their own autonomous governance, with all 
the resources of the oil soaked Niger delta. Between the two strokes, loyalties in the former Eastern 
Region were split. War appeared inevitable” 
Soyinka's narration does not include the parting shot that Ojukwu gave the next morning as he followed 
Awolowo to the tarmac to say goodbye. Shaking the Chief with both hands, Ojukwu said in Yoruba 
“Baba, atilo”   'Old one, we’ve gone'. (as Awolowo reported it to his followers).  As he took off from 
Enugu Airport with his fellow peace hunters, Awolowo knew that Biafra was on the cards. He did not 
expect Ojukwu to make as immediate an announcement as he did. But it should not have been any 
surprise. A prospective war leader who reveals a decision of such strategic significance to a prime 
decision-maker on the enemy side should not be expected to wait a moment longer than necessary to 
pre-empt a counterforce. It would have been better if Ojukwu had not told Awolowo anything about the 
plans to announce Biafra. But once he did, he was obliged to break whatever promise he had made. 
What kind of General would reveal such information to another, a potential antagonist, who had his 
own calculus of the power equation in the country that he was intent on splitting apart and not be 
worried  about the consequences of a leakage. The short of the matter is that once Ojukwu  discussed 
Biafra with Awolowo, it was, or should have been, clear that any promise he made about giving 
Awolowo a breathing to organize his own fraction would not be respected.   
As such, there is nothing in the forgotten documents to suggest that Ojukwu and Awolowo had reached 
any decisions about what to do if Ojukwu had waited. What Awolowo could have done can be left to the 
imagination. Only a very naïve Ojukwu could have accepted an agreement made with Awolowo as viable 
in the circumstances of  the Western Region at that time. Certainly, Ojukwu was not that naïve. He was 
calculating enough to have known that whatever influence Awolowo had over his Yoruba people was 
not enough. Ojukwu was Nigerian enough to know that that influence would not have much cut in a 
situation where a virtual occupation army, as Awolowo actually called it, commanded by a brazenly 
Northern catchment in the army, was sitting pretty in the Western Region. It was an army only just 
moving from a secessionist disposition to the format of national unity. What is now well known is that 
the Yoruba echelon in the Nigerian Army was roundly pro-unity. Among soldiers, on both sides, it was 
naïve to have expected that the Yoruba officers in the Army or even its civilian leadership would 
consider going into a coalition with an Igbo-led secessionist move without their having made a genuine 
contribution to the framing of the project. Were there to be a handshake across the Niger, it would have 
had to depend not on any one-sided plans but a community of grievances shared. The intelligence that 
Awolowo himself gathered impressionistically during the Enugu meeting gave him enough reason to 
believe, as he told his followers thereafter, that the Eastern Region was not prepared for the war it was 
about to embark upon. Even if he was the most feckless leader in the world, and Awolowo was not 
known to embark on a project he had not given much thought to, there was hardly a chance that he 
would agree to go into a war on Ojukwu's side on the basis of a two week mobilization of his people. 
Incidentally, Awolowo's hunch was shared on harder evidence by Biafran military leaders led by Hilary 
Njoku who knew that Biafrans had been stampeded into but not readied for war. In order to appreciate 
Hilary Njoku's position, many people would need to read Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's novel, Half of a 
Yellow Sun, the love story in a time of war, if only for the atmospherics. It shows how the General gave 
wooden sticks to his people, as civil defenders, in a shooting war claiming that no force in Black Africa 
could subdue Biafra. Sheer emotional grandstanding was what the war effort rested upon. But for the 
shenanigans on the Federal side, the deliberate pussy-footing and sometimes larking in the war front, as 
a way of setting the stage to settle some scores with the authorities in Lagos, it would have been a 
much-shorter war. 
As readers of Onukaba Adinoyi Ojo's biography of  Obasanjo must know,   Murtala Muhammed never 
gave up his grouse:  “We told you not to end the war the way you did so as to sort things out, you went 
gaddam gaddam (Hausa expression for heedless rush) and finished it. Now you have a lion in your 
hands, a  lion that does not roar, bite or claw, absolutely inefficient and ineffective”, Muhammed 
charged impulsively.”   
As for the People’s General in Biafra, he was carried shoulder high on a wave that he could have resisted 
and steered in a different direction but preferred to manipulate. At any rate, what Awolowo had offered 
Ojukwu as a solution to the crisis was absolutely outside the rooting for secession. It was more coherent 
and more consistent with his already fairly well known position  on Federalism and a strategy of 
welfarism as a solution to the Nigerian crisis. At the meeting, as the published document shows, 
Awolowo believed that:…….“What we want in Nigeria is a house to be built which will be big enough to 
accommodate all of us, without friction, without trouble. Let us have a plan made, let us get an expert 
contractor to build the house. When the house is completed to our satisfaction let them call it what 
name they like, what is important is that the house should be big enough to accommodate all of us 
comfortably, without friction and without trouble. I think we should forget about federation or 
confederation. Let us see what the contents are going to be. Once the contents are stated then we will 
allow political scientists to give it a name they like. The name does not matter to us so long so we are 
satisfied that this is the sort of thing we need to make us live together as Nigerians. 
“I was a little bit disturbed by the point you made before. I hope you have not taken a final decision on 
it, that is, that the East will not associate with the North in future. Easterners have fought more  than 
any other group in this country over the years to make Nigeria what it is , or what it was, before the 
crisis began. I think it will be a pity if they just forget something for which they have laboured for years . 
Many of the Easterners who fought for “One Nigeria” are no longer with us. It will not be a good tribute 
to their memory by destroying that “ one Nigeria”., Certainly, it is not going to be the same as it used to 
be. I have taken a stand on that, and I am prepared to drop tribal labels at the moment, but I know in 
my own mind what sort of thing I have in view for the federation. But I think it will be a great pity and 
tragedy and disservice to the memories of all those who have gone to disband Nigeria. An here we are 
not here to criticize anybody, I think it is generally agreed that some units have done more for the unity 
of Nigeria than others. The East certainly have not yielded first place to anyone in that regard. I would 
like you to consider that aspect very seriously”. 
This position taken on Saturday 6th May 1967 was quite in sync with the position he had taken at a 
meeting of the Leaders of Thought meeting at the Western Hall, Agodi, Ibadan, on Monday 1st of May, 
1967. In that speech, his aim was to undermine the position of those Nigerian Leaders of Thought who, 
as he later explained, were “seriously suggesting that the so-called  four component units of the country 
should go their own separate ways as so many sovereign states”. Specifically, he meant to repudiate the 
proposition that the Federation would be viable even without the East as was being canvassed by some 
people who had, in his words, “settled it finally in their minds the sort of Constitution they consider 
suitable for the whole country, or such part of it as may be left after the East shall have opted out of the 
Federation”. 
At the Agodi meeting, he placed four imperatives before  the Western Nigerian Leaders of Thought in 
particular and the Nation in general. Of the Four Imperatives he said: 
“Two of them are categorical imperatives and two are conditional. 
ONE: Only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the present worsening stalemate and restore 
normalcy. 
TWO: The Eastern Region must be encouraged to remain part of the Federation. 
THREE: If the Eastern Region is allowed  by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of 
Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation. 
FOUR: The people of Western Nigeria and Lagos should participate in the AD Hoc Committee or any 
similar Body only on the basis of absolute equality with the other Regions of the Federation” 
It would require a major somersault in logic to make this look like a vote for the secession of any part of 
Nigeria. Actually as early as August 1966, on his being repreived from his  ten year imprisonment, 
Awolowo had made a speech in which he said: “The breaking up of Nigeria into a number of sovereign 
states would not only do permanent damage to the reputation of contemporary Nigerian leaders but 
would also usher in terrible disasters which would bedevil us and many generations to come.”  To 
contort such a speech in favour of secession belongs to a vaulting refusal to see no reason that is not 
pro-secession. To insist however that Awolowo encouraged the Igbo to secede actually insults the 
intelligence of the average Igbo.  The implication is that after the pogrom of 1966, it required an 
Obafemi Awolowo, whether as a goad or quarry to hearten the attempt at secession. It is close to saying 
that they thought of an alternative that was different but had to bow to Awolowo's, an old enemy's, 
prodding. This may be the picture that many Biafrans liked to have of themselves. Those who think the 
Igbos deserve a better picture of themselves may be called names. But it does not change the score. 
What is interesting in this regard is that well known acts perpetrated by other leaders during the war are 
actually now being credited to Awolowo by postwar propagandists and are being made to stick beyond 
lines of collective responsibility while actual performances that he made are smudged out of 
acknowledgement. For a man who could be said to have done more than any other single individual to 
have garnered the out-of-the-war-front intelligence to keep Nigeria as one country, it is actually a 
surprise to see how little Federal cover has been given to Awolowo   by Federal agencies and 
establishments. Generals who were worried that Awolowo might convert his proficiency in the 
management of the country’s finances and general affairs into political power certainly preffered that 
the war story be told against him. For ex-Biafrans who believe that Awolowo disabled their war efforts 
through his many ploys, including the change of the currency, the refusal to devalue the Naira, and the 
ordering of a stop to food corridors, Awolowo deserves to be sent to the International court even post-
humously. The concentration on Awolowo as it turns out is such a fixation that many are prepared to 
believe that even if Awolowo was still in prison when the pogrom took place, he should be arraigned for 
it.  It is very much unlike the position taken by the Jews who not only went after exposing the 
perpetrators of the holocaust after the Second World War but took extremely inter-subjective care to 
ensure that no innocents were punished for crimes that others committed. The reverse, clearly, is the 
case with the  Nigerian crisis and civil war. It is quite interesting in this regard, and perhaps, a  mark of 
Achebe’s forgiving nature that in his The Trouble with Nigeria,  he grants the status of arch-nationalist to 
Mallam Aminu Kano, of  whose faction of the People’s Redemption Party, PRP, he became a member, 
even after knowing  of the Mallam’s mobilization of the resistance to feared Igbo domination after the 
January 15 Coup. Or he did not know it?  Allan Feinstein, Mallam’s biographer, had given enough leads 
to explain the radical leader’s  mobilization of the North before the pogrom. On page 225 of The African 
Revolutionary ,the autobiography of Mallam Aminu Kano, he writes that his subject “had to decide what 
was  right for his country and his North ……..Aminu Kano’s  smouldering fear of Southern domination 
had finally culminated in what he considered a genuine and serious threat to the development of his 
first love, Northern Nigeria”. As it happened, Aminu Kano was arrested in connection with the pogrom in 
the North but was promptly released for want of evidence. Decades later, as the issues are being 
memorialized by key actors  of that era, the post-coup mobilization has been coming under new lights. 
As happened, it was  Alhaji Ahmed Joda, a top aide to Major Hassan Usman Katsina, Governor of 
Northern Region, who was sent by “top civil servants” in Kaduna to meet with Alhaji Maitama Sule in 
Kano to “initiate leadership in getting the people of the North to understand the aims of government” 
after the January 1966 coup. On pages 211 -212 of  the biography, Maitama Sule..Danmasanin Kano by 
Ayuba T. Abubakar, it is told of how it was  Maitama Sule,  an NPC stalwart before the coup, who 
“suggested that Mallam Aminu Kano  was the most suitable, because he was widely respected, never 
held a government leadership appointment and had the people behind him. Again, he was a leading 
figure in UPGA……So Maitama arranged for Mallam Aminu to meet Alhaji Joda the following day. 
Thereafter, Mallam  Aminu Kano became the leading consultant  for the government and top civil 
servants and their link with the rest of the North”.  In The Story of a Humble Life: An Autobiography, 
Tanko Yakasai, an Aminu Kano  deputy in the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) 
authenticates the story: “At the beginning,  most NEPU members were happy with the military take 
over. It was only after some few days that they started to think twice about the situation……the way 
some Igbo traders at Sabongari market in Kano started to treat Northerners”.  A meeting was then held 
in Aminu Kano’s house in Sudawa by old NEPU stalwarts. Aminu Kano  “drew the attention of the 
meeting to the apathy pervading the political scene in the North and urged those present to  rise up to 
the occasion; otherwise it would be difficult to rejuvenate political interest in the people. The meeting 
then decided that a tour of the Northern Region should be undertaken to make contact with opinion 
leaders with a view to alerting them of the danger posed by that situation. The tour was to be 
undertaken under the guise of paying condolence visits to the families and traditional rulers of those 
killed during the military take-over. ……….We started from Sokoto, followed by Bauchi and Maiduguri. 
Within a few weeks, we covered the whole region”.  (page 221). Although accused of having joined the 
NPC, “we continued with our mobilization campaign”, writes Tanko Yakasai. Of course, there were 
different contact groups mobilizing, sometimes with cross-cutting memberships. They  were all to make 
what seemed a consensual response to Major General Aguiyi Ironsi’s  Unification Decree which 
according to Tanko Yakasai  “created a lot of fear in the minds of the civil servants and traditional 
rulers….”.  A protest rally organized in Kano against the Unification Decree turned the seething anger 
into a region-wide prairie fire that grew into the pogrom against the Igbo and those associated with 
them.  As it happened, the pogrom preceded and accompanied the Revenge Coup of July 29 1966. 
The matter of interest is that Awolowo was still in prison at Calabar when it all began to happen. But it 
was after the exodus of the Igbo back to the East and of many southerners from the North; and then, 
the failure of the various leaders of Thought meetings, including the Aburi meeting in Ghana, to resolve 
the consequent loss of faith in  the idea of a united country, that secession was declared. And war 
began. In the narration of the crisis and the tragedies of the war, different partisans have chosen what 
to emphasize between the grisly images of the pogrom and the guitar-ribbed and kwashiorkor ridden 
children in Biafra and the direct casualties in the war front. Who to blame from the perspective of those  
who suffered the dire consequences? To ask is to put history in a quandary because in the situation of 
organized anarchies that preceded the war, it is the botched January 15 Coup that takes the rap.  All 
murders are bad but it was the unrounded nature of the violence, the lopsided regional accounting, that 
Nigerians, North and South, will always remember. It turned jubilation into self-questioning angst. The 
truth is that the years of distrust already on the ground, allowed for an interpretation which was 
incorrect. Otherwise, it did not start as an Igbo coup. It was turned into one by successive acts of 
commission and omission which could have been averted by greater exercise of cultural empathy. This 
was,  unwisely knocked aside; not just by the arrogance of power that all military rule insinuates,  but 
the inability of the new rulers at the centre to see Nigeria as a family of different nationalities needing 
an effort of mind and a lot of civility to turn into a nation of shared conversations. Admittedly, the 
leaders had their prejudices; but the necessity for shared living called for learning how to let people 
govern themselves irrespective of how unprepared they appeared to be. Education for leadership 
needed to have begun from having laws that were not tilted against any part of the polity. 
Unfortunately, once violence became the definition of the terms of association, it was not going to be 
easy to retract. As violence led to more violence, whoeveot on top sought a  draconian hold in order not 
to be sucked into its quicksand and boil. Hence those who began by detesting a unitary system of 
government  ended up creating a unitary hegemony.  Trust and a basis for stability became goals to be 
achieved through  a lopsided  cut. The point is that nothing could replace the effort that needs to be 
made in every society, even one that is uni-cultural rather than multi-ethnic and multi-religious, to let 
decision –making come from within a community rather than as an imposition. It so happens that the 
failure of the first coup, as with all succeeding ones  in Nigeria’s history  came from pursuing the 
opposite of what they claimed they wanted.  By being generally of a lopsided cut, all of them morphed 
into preparations for a genocide of sorts.  Thus, once the pogrom in the North created the basis for a 
war, or at least some form of return violence, the word genocide had become  regionally or ethnically 
positioned to account what would follow. Specific to the period of civil war:  those who used the term 
genocide tended to do so in the sense of a propaganda pitch to rev the cause or score points in the 
competition for international alms, arms, and domestic  power. Not distinguishing the pogrom in the 
North from the actual deaths and derangement of life found in the war situations was quite a grand 
strategy of Biafrans. Truth is, once war was declared, both sides were on a mutual genocidal binge. Put  
the word to some test and it turns out to have been so much a  ploy to attract support for Biafra, as the 
rebel stronghold shrank from all of Eastern Region to the closed-in Igbo heartland. The weight of  
Federal might, against the fast diminishing rebel territory, could not evade the sheerness of it: that the 
pounding of one identifiable set of Nigerians, had the implication of a geno-factor. A war in a multi-
ethnic society poses this execrable frame. Only those who love war may try to deodorize it by 
pretending that it does not yield forms of genocide. On both sides of the Nigerian civil war, the 
genocidal instincts were quite alert. And knowing that genocides are such bad things, propagandists  
reached for international support by playing it ur down. This is why talking about the starving children of  
Biafra as an incidence of genocide turns out not to be such a straightforward matter. Biafra lost much 
international support, except for the  sentimentality of Caritas, when it was discovered, and discussed 
across the world, that the General of the People’s Army was engaged in unethical profiling of starving 
children in order to attract international sympathy. In his letter of resignation from his $400,000 
contract and his post as Public Relations Representative of Biafra in the United States, Robert S. 
Goldstein, who had helped to build up much international concern for Biafra wrote to the Biafran 
Commander in chief as follows:  “It is inconceivable to me that you would stop the feeding of thousands 
of your countrymen (under auspices of world organizations such as the international Red cross, world 
council of churches and many more)via a land corridor which is the only practical way to bring in food to 
help at this time………..I cannot serve you any longer. Nor can I be party to suppressing the fact that your 
starving thousands have the food, medicine and milk available to them….it can and is ready to be 
delivered through international organizations to you. Only your constant refusal has stopped its 
delivery.”  This piece of archival material may well have been a propaganda coup for the Federal side 
but, as its publication in Nigeria’s Morning Post showed, it cannot be excluded from the story without 
missing the real flavor of the times. It therefore be claimed without fear of contradiction that, around 
the much-trumpeted genocide, was a  Biafran proto-state that was prepared to send some well-placed 
children out of harm’s way to  havens in Ivory Coast and elsewhere in the world but was using other  
people’s children in Biafra as guinea pigs for propaganda purposes.  The truth, bitter, as it must sound, is 
that once war was declared, both  sides were on a genocidal binge that no post-war leveraging can 
undo. 
For that matter, the reverse side of the Biafran charge of genocide against the Federal side is that the 
charge can be firmly and rigorously laid that Biafra sent people into combat who had no weapons to 
fight in a real war. And there was a vast civilian population whose food needs were not considered an 
issue either in the initial promotion of war frenzy or in the course of the war.  Those who continue to 
trip on the propaganda of war, and are probably hoping that they would be given food stamps and 
reliefs if they manage to plunge Nigeria into another war with their unthinking fictions,  need to be told 
that it will not be called a war if one side must feed the other side. As actually happened. That such 
considerations were always there, and were seriously entertained, is why many writers call the Nigerian 
Civil war a phoney war. Or a brother’s war. The gleeful latching upon Awolowo's statement that 
starvation is a weapon of war as  a means of raking up old inter-ethnic animosities or winning a 
prosecutor’s slot in a Nuremberg-type trial, wont change this reality. Even the Federal side which 
allowed and then stopped food shipment to Biafra knew it was merely trying to fulfill all righteousness. 
Who has yet found a way to stop soldiers in any theatre of war from hijacking the food meant for the 
civilian populations?  Who does not know that soldiers move on their stomachs and are more likely to 
hijack food meant for civilians than not?   Starkly, the question is always there: whether or how to to 
allow a welfare package to the other side without committing suicide. War may  thereby be prolonged. 
But this is talking about a war between brothers.  Sad, it is, that the truly brotherly elements that 
characterized the waging of the war on both sides of the Nigerian civil war have not been allowed to 
surface by the spoilsports of the propaganda Ministries who do not allow accounting for the foods and 
beer shared across battle lines between the combatants. Not to forget the egregious observance of 
eight-hour war-day on the Federal side and the deliberate slowing down of Federal aggression which, 
sometimes humanitarian but based on scheming for power in Lagos, lengthened the period of warfare 
and may unwittingly have been responsible for the many civilian deaths through hunger. 
Talking war as war, when Biafrans made the famous incursion into the Midwest State, were  they 
thinking of the convenience of Midwesterners?  Their strategic exigencies had little  place for  the 
sensibilities of a region that had shown much sympathy for the Biafran cause up to the point of not 
allowing the region to be a staging post for launching an attack on Biafra. But Biafrans treated the region 
as mere faggot for the fire. It turned out that the military Governor of the state, David Ejoor had been 
out-numbered and out-gunned by Igbo-speaking elements in his cabinet who actually out-voted him, six 
by three, when the pressure came for Biafrans to be allowed to come in. So we can argue, strictu sensu, 
that Biafra did not invade the Midwest. Biafra was invited into the Midwest State. Hence, as many 
writers on the war have reported, no shot was fired. The food and other resources, including hard 
currency, for whose sake the incursion was made, may have been a good enough bargain for the 
incoming army. It ended up however, exposing a lot of untoward factors including ethnic arrogance, 
which told the minority ethnic nationalities in the war-torn South what could continue to happen to 
them if they remained part of Biafra. To think of it, the easy indifference to the rights of the minority 
ethnic nationalities who itched to take their own lives in their own hands  was what horridly vitiated the 
whole idea of the Biafran enterprise. And it was this that gave the Federal side such moral authority, 
egged on, since the Revenge coup, by the release of Adaka Boro and his co-partisans who had been 
sentenced to death, awaiting execution, for  pushing secession for a Niger Delta Republic. It was this 
that kept the creation of new states on the hot burner even without the threat of  a Biafran secession to 
grant its inexorability. The bottom line is that the evidence of people seeking freedom for themselves  
without considering that others also needed it was what provided the moral fuel that routed Biafra, 
even as much as Federal guns and the idea of starvation as a weapon of war. 
Let’s face it: it rankles. I mean, the long-standing and brazen refusal to recognize that there were others 
in the Eastern Region  and in the Midwest who also lost a lot of relations  in the pogrom, and who 
deserved to be treated like the proper nationalities that they were, rather than as pariahs in their own 
country! What may well be taken as a factor in this is that it was Awolowo’s fate, from early in his 
career, to have earned the dislike of so many whose region, including his own, he had continuously 
slated for splitting into their ethnic fractions in pursuit of his brand of federalism. The creation of states, 
along ethnic lines, his lifelong  pursuit, sought the turning of Nigeria from a mere geographical 
expression to a cultural expression, a nation, through the establishment of a common access for all and 
sundry to free education, free health, full employment and pensions and the freedom of the press and 
judiciary.  No question about it: Awolowo was a very ambitious man. He believed in becoming the leader 
of a great country that could lift Africa up. He felt it would be  a belittling of his project if he stood by to 
allow an energetic and ebullient nationality like the Igbo to excise themselves  through the fecklessness 
of those who would send people to death in their millions rather than prepare them for the future with 
the calculating gumption of true generals.  For him, it was sad to hear people talk about how much the 
masses in Biafra wanted war, as if Generals are not supposed to be specially trained to see beyond 
anger and bitterness and therefore to be able to appraise situations objectively, and thus to obviate 
feckless projecteering in the name of war. Do you send your children to commit suicide because you are 
angry with an enemy?  Where went that proverb which says that you do not ask who killed your father 
until you are firmly holding a matchete from the right side? So what was Biafra’s handle on the basis of 
which the world was told that no power in black Africa could subdue her? 
These, I must add,  are questions that I think we should all bear in mind, as we confront situations such 
as when those returning home to Nigeria after Biafra found a country not too different from the one 
they left. Unhappily, the Biafra they knew maltreated Biafrans as much if not more than Nigeria kept 
maltreating Nigerians. To be borne in mind is that much of it came more from improper organizational 
setups, plain incompetence, rather than sheer wickedness or hatred as we are all being made to believe 
when we come to it. Rather than describe the problems with a clarity that allows for seeking genuine 
solutions, we get all manner of exorbitance, which push away answers and solutions.  For instance, as a 
way of laying a basis for more disharmony between  ex-Biafrans and fellow Nigerian siblings, we are not 
told about  the many who returned to find that their properties were intact and that people actually 
protected their rights in those properties in their absence. We are not told about the many valiant 
efforts that were made by other Nigerians to rehabilitate the East. It may not have been more 
competently done than all the other things that were happening in the country. But quite a brave effort 
it was, making it possible for General Yakubu Gowon, whatever his many lapses,  to be seen 
internationally as doing a yeoman’s job, personifying his unitarian precepts including an immediate 
representation of the East in the Supreme Military Council after the war. For that matter,  there were 
too many elements of a siblings war, at least from the Federal side, in spite of the inevitability of both 
sides seeking and using the most deadly weapons that money could buy. Take it from the start of police 
action to full scale war;  the charge to soldiers to a close observance of the Geneva convention during 
the war, the implied necessity to treat all the captured fairly and decently  - and many were court-
martialed who broke the rules – right through to the post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. The No 
Victor No Vanquished code may have had flabs but the re-absorbtion of former soldiers back into the 
Nigerian military, many of whom soon became high flying, and civil servants , who were granted special  
three weeks leave and granted ‘mercy pay’ to help them settle down, all these are not heard of in the 
post-war propaganda. Nor is it heard enough about the special clearance for ships bringing in post-war 
reliefs. 
After the war, there was clearly more than a silver lining which ought to be acknowledged even in the 
face of the harsh circumstances that existed.  It is in the fact declared by SG Ikoku, the Commissioner for 
Economic Development in East Central State in the Daily Times of May 22, 1971   that “the Federal 
Government had made available 21.505 million pounds grant and 10.620 million as advances and loans. 
It was part of the accumulated amounts saved for the East Central State during the war by Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, the Commissioner for Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, 
on the basis of population distribution of revenue. No one, these days, is  ever allowed to know this little 
matter even if the point is to show how well those who wanted the Biafrans dead followed the financial 
regulations that guided the Federation and so kept what was due to the East in reserve for them till they 
returned to the fold. This is not even to ask about  how the money was actually spent, which I am sure 
must be blamed on those who had saved the money. Besides, there really ought now to be a cross-
check of Awolowo’s claim that he saved African Continental Bank post-haste  in order to help shore up 
the economy of the East. Or how quickly the Niger bridge was rebuilt, the cement factories rehabilitated 
and the African Development Bank cashiered into rehabilitation work with agricultural loans that 
Federal authorities had to look away from appraising on strict terms. Such things were  left in the way 
that those who took monies from Biafra to buy food and ammunition but failed to deliver have been 
forgotten with their loot of war. 
This is why, across the social media, it is painful to encounter the many angry discussants of the civil war 
years who see it only in terms of what needed to have been done for the East. We hear so much so 
much about the absolute deprivation of Biafrans through the granting of N20 ex-gratia payment (slightly 
more than the equivalent of a third class clerks monthly pay) to every survivor after the war. It is 
forgotten that it was meant as a short-term welfare package to enable many get back to their homes 
from wherever they were at when the war ended. It was not meant to be payment for being rebels or as 
an exchange for Biafran money. That was why it was called ex-gratia. It was supposed to be a provisional 
payment while sorting out those who could still find the papers to prove how much they had in their 
accounts. Accountably, the system collapsed. Only a few could have managed to keep their papers who 
had not already emptied their accounts while they were leaving a country they did not intend to come 
back to.   
Admittedly, the whole matter called for a  special exercise of leadership on all sides. 
It called for genuine brokerage techniques, of lobbying and even muzzling of whoever was in authority 
to act beyond the rule of law and to find a way of resolving the clearly confused circumstance of so 
many people having Biafran money in a country where it was impossible to regard it as legal tender. But 
just as in the planning for the war, there was so much left undone even in the manner and mode of 
surrender.  After the war, I used to wonder why the leaders dissolved into atoms. I am saying this partly 
because I am yet to meet someone who has vouchsafed a formula that could have resolved the matter 
of the ex-gratia payments without rancor. Even today, no one is volunteering how it could have been 
done better. The same goes for the issue of abandoned property which no longer had a public advocacy 
once Sam Mbakwe who had briefed Awolowo to take the matter to court was importuned to withdraw 
it on the awkward reasoning that if Awolowo won the case in court he would make political capital out 
of it. It became a case of better not fight the abandoned property issue for the masses, if some old 
enemy would share in the glory. Hence the matter festered till it became a case of everyone for himself. 
The General of the People’s Army  had to wait till as late as the last week of General Ibrahim Babangida 
in office in 1993 to wrest his own abandoned property. We don't know about those who never had that 
luck. We don't know about the soldiers who could not get their pensions after the General got his. It is 
the way the post-civil war atomization of demands got covered up by a rev of self-interest that many like 
to present as the interest of the whole nationality.  The truth is that those to whom things happened, 
and who hardly had a chance of happening to anything, but suffered all the same, never had champions. 
It left many grumblers in the public space who are wondering why others wont fight battles they 
themselves have  been obliged to abandon. 
The shame of the moment is that, unable to look the history of our differences in the face, we allow 
ourselves to be flattered or incensed by sheer serenades of ethnic and regional fictions. Even  those who 
know that it is bad for  their ethnic groups to seek to live like islands unto themselves are gleefully 
developing  discrepant moralities: a benign one for themselves and a pernicious or predatory morality 
for others.  It is usually based on bad logic and poor thinking, as much of this narrative has shown. The 
point is, when people think badly they want to hide it by putting the rest of us in situations where, if we 
disagree, we can be accused of  being haters of  their ethnic group or nationality. So I may be told that a 
proverb belongs to an ethnic group so that if I disagree with the bad thinking that goes with it I may be 
charged with pushing for ethnocide or genocide.  It is a form of blackmail that yields backwardness for a 
people. It something that deserves to be back-handed off. We  should feel free to  show our dislike  for 
it. When people are being roughed up by their own, we should all cry out as when they are  being 
roughed up by other people. By the same token, if bad logic is claimed for  or by an ethnic group, we 
need to see it as  self-immolation on everyone’s part to sit quiet and say it is their business. It is not just 
their business.  Because their bad logic will not let  neighbours live well or rest in peace. It obliges us to 
be always our brothers’ keepers. Even then, we need always to contest the veracity of what is claimed 
against other perceptions of reality.  Until  cultural empathy is achieved or approximated.   I mean: not 
even the disabilities and pains of one life authorizes that life to deny other lives their due. 
This makes it truly odd, to see it being suggested so incongruously, at the end of the war, that it was 
those who hated Igbo people who were working so hard to bring them back to Nigeria by force! Or  who 
were threatening to leave Nigeria if the Igbo were ever to be allowed to go; and going the whole hog to 
plead with Igbo leaders not to go to war! It does not add up. It may be good for war propaganda to tone 
the hatreds that shored up the conflict . But it  does not make good post-war logic. Irrespective  of the 
polemics and  rhetorical afflatus that, since then, have bedeviled public arguments with notions of how 
Nigeria has no future,  it is clear that a Nigeria together, as it is, even with all the poor quality of the  
quarrels that we all have with one another, is a better country than the fractionized  mayhem, each 
acting like a mini anarchic Nigeria, which we would otherwise  have to deal with, in the event of a break-
up.  On this score, it is such a fantastic deal to have an Awolowo, solid, disciplined, thoughtful, far-
seeing, on the right side. He believed in the country and showed it during the civil war.  He deserves to 
be truly lionized for it, not left in the brambles of the fiction-mongers who wish to turn the re-uniting of 
Nigeria into ashes in the mouths of all succeeding generations. The truth is that,  even without the 
benefit of a poll, it can be safely asserted that there are too many Nigerians who agreed and still agree 
that Nigeria deserved to have been saved from disintegration and kept as one country. Some may be 
having second thoughts because of some recent events. But  Nigeria as one country was a business well 
worth doing. The mode in which the Igbo are all over Nigeria proves it. We must not allow ourselves to 
be intimidated into regressing in the tripe of those who do not agree. No question about it: this country 
is still the closest that Africa has to one that is able to stand up to the rest of the world and thrive for the 
good of all Africans. Even the supposed differences that some people deplore, and Awolowo spent his 
life seeking to re-engineer in creative directions,  are actually part of the strength of this country. Who 
wants to live in a country that is all winnowed ethic, one monochrome, without arguments and debates, 
and all dead matter, mere ornament! The point is to prepare all concerned  to work for a defined future 
rather than merely grumbling, seeking scapegoats for our own failings, dousing it with cynical rhetoric, 
while waiting for an undefined future like manna from heaven.  
My grouse, in this regard, is that the issues, as they concern the civil war, are not being discussed in 
terms of what the leaders of the East owed the people but failed to deliver. Most of the intellectuals and 
leaders of opinion go about seeking to entrench fictions that merely disable the capacity of the ex-
Biafrans to build with other Nigerians. The good thing is that the average Igbo man and woman is way 
ahead of the griping ones who do not know that the civil war ended long ago. They are everywhere long 
gone beyond sweating talk about how  to become Nigerians. They have proved it that they are just 
bloody Nigerians like the rest of us. Others, instead of helping the people to think through the necessity 
to get empowerment through education, industry and genuine employment, are busy reproducing 
fictions that landed the country in the current mess of incivility.  Adding no value to existing answers 
beyond the fluff of ethnic nationalism that masquerades as high-mindedness, they are blaming 
neighbors for the mess they helped to create by not caring or standing up for an identifiable principle. It 
is certainly no way to go.  Similarly, the habit of shouting “my people, my people” has  become a way of 
not caring for or about the people. This can be proved by simply asking why all the governments in the 
zone contrived so much helplessness for forty years while the roads in the East deteriorated to war-time 
conditions. In a region where trade is an eze with feathers on a red cap, you would have expected that 
all the governments in the zone would come together as a matter of emergency to tackle the monster 
that was ruining the ethic of commerce. A people so energetic and gutsy, pumping so much enterprise 
across the country ought really never to be seen so self- neglecting as to be waiting for others to raise or 
de-maginalize them. Unless as a strategy for getting more and more in the national spoils system! I 
mean, it is plain bad manners to blame other Nigerians who have not found answers to their problems 
and with whom cooperation is a fitter strategy than the politics of the gripe. At any rate, which part of 
Nigeria is in a good state?  Where  have industries  not collapsed and public  schools not been mired in a 
sorry state?   
As I see it, a distracted individualism which some people prefer to describe as republicanism, is being 
priced above a genuine sitting down to plan with and for the people. What it calls for, instead of 
inventing enemies, and seeing competition in zero-sum terms, is a mobilization of  affect and resources 
to rise above the disabilities that we all share as Nigerians. We do need to bring the civil war to a proper 
end by looking into the past without flinching and wresting ourselves from the goblins of pernicious 
fictions. The bottomline, as I have argued in Taking Nigerian Seriously, is that there is no Igbo solution to 
the Nigerian problem; no Yoruba, Efik, Hausa, Fulani, Edo, Ijaw, or Kanuri solution. Until we allow 
cultural empathy to govern the roost, and we learn to work consciously for the much maligned 
geographical expression to accede to heightening the cultural expression that it has already much 
become, the tendency to take refuge in pernicious fictions will not abate. 
